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1 Introduction
Investment in human capital is essential to promoting economic growth and so-
cial welfare in a society (Barro, 2001; Galor and Moav, 2004; Goldin and Katz,
2008; Schultz, 1961).1 A critical question is how to distribute educational re-
sources between students with varying learning abilities (Lafortune, Rothstein,
and Schanzenbach, 2018; OECD, 2018).2 For decades, the key priority in most
OECD countries has been to ensure that all students pass a minimum profi-
ciency bar. More recently, there has been an increasing focus on strengthening
the learning outcomes of all students, including high-ability learners (Every Stu-
dent Succeeds Act 2015; OECD, 2018). Given the importance of these policies
for society, puzzlingly little is known about people’s preferences for how to pri-
oritize educational resources (Busemeyer, Lergetporer, and Woessmann, 2018).
I conduct what is, to my knowledge, the first experiment designed to elicit
people’s preferences regarding how society should distribute educational re-
sources. Inspired by policy debates (Finn and Wright, 2015; Goldstein, 2018),
I focus on two distinct groups of students, quick and slow learners, and study
how people trade off resources between these two groups. In an incentivized
field experiment with a general population sample of over 2,000 Americans, I
identify how people trade off actual educational resources between real students
with differing learning abilities. I causally identify how the resource allocations
depend on cost efficiency and on the motivation of the learners. Further, I shed
light on the underlying mechanisms, including the role of beliefs about the rel-
ative returns to education and preferences regarding how to trade off equity and
efficiency in human capital investment.
In the experiment, the participants act as impartial third parties to provide a
direct expression of their moral preferences (Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen, and
Tungodden, 2013). The participants distribute 12 hours of one-to-one tutoring
between a quick and a slow learner, recruited via US-based non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). While keeping important background characteristics
constant between the learners, I provide additional treatment variations to study
1For further discussion of the link between human capital investment, economic growth and
social welfare, see, e.g., Becker (1962); Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005); Goldin (2016);
Manuelli and Seshadri (2014); Mincer (1958); Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011).
2There are a number of other important questions in the literature on human capital invest-
ment, including how to respond to the boy crisis in education (Cappelen, Falch, and Tungodden,
2019b) and how to design fair and efficient adolescent skill policies (Heckman, 2006).
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mechanisms. Using a 2x2 design, I vary i) whether the participants receive in-
formation about the quick learner being highly motivated, and ii) whether there
is an added cost of allocating tutoring to the slow learner. Further, I elicit beliefs
about the relative improvement of the learners (given equal amounts of tutor-
ing), and the relative societal and individual welfare losses associated with the
quick and slow learners failing to reach their full learning potential.
The paper offers a number of findings on how people prefer to trade off
educational resources between quick and slow learners. First, most of the par-
ticipants give priority to the slow learner, with the quick learners being allocated
one third of the educational resources on average. In the base treatment, even
though most participants believe that the quick learners improve their school
performance more with the tutoring, 70.4% of them allocate the majority of
the educational resources to the slow learner. The priority given to the slow
learners is robust across all treatments. The participants assign more tutoring
to the slow learners even when it is not cost-efficient to do so, and when they
know that the quick learner is highly motivated. Second, I show that cost ef-
ficiency causally matters for the distributive decision: the participants reduce
the amount of tutoring to the slow learner when it becomes costlier. Third, I
causally identify that the motivation of the students is also considered relevant
for how educational resources should be distributed. Finally, I provide evidence
suggesting that people’s preferences for human capital investment policies are
affected by individual welfare considerations, and in particular the welfare of
the slow learner.
The results provide insights into several important policy debates. First,
the findings shed light on the public support for the increased priority of high-
ability learners in the US. This increased priority came with the signing of the
Every Student Succeeds Act in 2015, which replaced the 2002 No Child Left
Behind Act and its almost exclusive focus on improving the learning outcomes
of struggling and low-performing students. The new act introduced tracking of
high-ability learners and more funding opportunities to strengthen their learning
outcomes, thereby mirroring the emerging shift in education policy priorities in
the OECD (OECD, 2018). Relevant to these debated shifts in policy priorities,
the present paper shows that, while people prioritize slow learners, they do not
exclude efforts to strengthen the performance of quick learners to whom they
allocate on average one third of the educational resources. Further, the present
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paper provides insight into the public support for education policies address-
ing the boy crisis, where boys are falling behind in school and dropping out
at higher rates than girls (Autor and Wasserman, 2013; Cappelen et al., 2019b;
OECD, 2017). Additionally, the paper sheds light on the public opinion on the
equity-efficiency trade-off linked to how much should be invested in adolescent
skill policies aimed at reducing inequality based on socioeconomic backgrounds
(Elango, Garcı́a, Heckman, and Hojman, 2015; Heckman, 2006; Marks, 2014).
In both cases, additional resources are needed to help struggling and often un-
motivated students reach a basic level of skills and avoid drop-out. Relevant
to these debates, I find that people allocate the majority of the educational re-
sources to the slow learners, despite believing that they are not very motivated
and despite it not being cost-efficient.
The present study contributes to three strands of literature. The first stud-
ies how beliefs about pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns to human capital
investment impact individual and parental human capital investment decisions
(Almås, Cappelen, Salvanes, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2016; Attanasio, Boneva,
and Rauh, Forthcoming; Berry, Dizon-Ross, and Jagnani, 2020; Boneva and
Rauh, 2017, 2018; Dizon-Ross, 2019; Jensen, 2010; Oreopoulos and Salvanes,
2011). The research has focused on understanding decisions on whether and
how much to invest. I extend this literature by looking at a different type of hu-
man capital investment decisions, namely in whom people prefer to invest.3 In
contrast to a parental perspective, the present paper examines people’s prefer-
ences for human capital investments from a societal perspective. Taken together,
the present paper extends the literature on preferences for human capital invest-
ment to the education policy domain, shedding light on people’s preferences on
important issues in current policy debates (Autor and Wasserman, 2013; Autor,
2014; Heckman, 2013; OECD, 2018).
The paper also contributes to the literature on people’s attitudes towards
education policy. The literature has largely focused on the support for public
education spending as a whole, or relative to other government spending areas
(Bursztyn, 2016; Busemeyer et al., 2018). There are also survey experiments on
the effect of information provision on public support for various education poli-
3Dizon-Ross (2019) and Berry et al. (2020) study parental human capital investment deci-
sions among poor families in Malawi. They find that the parents’ investment level and distri-
bution of resources between their children depend on their beliefs about their children’s relative
educational performance and abilities.
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cies: Lergetporer, Schwerdt, Werner, West, and Woessmann (2018) find that in-
formation about existing spending levels reduces support for increased spending
levels and teacher salaries, while Lergetporer, Werner, and Woessmann (2020)
study the effect of information about educational inequality on concerns for ed-
ucational inequality, and the support for equity-oriented education policies to
alleviate the inequality. Lergetporer et al. (2020) find that concern for edu-
cational inequality, and to some degree the support for equity-oriented policies,
increases with information. I extend this literature by conducting an incentivized
experiment on people’s preferences for how to distribute educational resources
in society. In contrast to the previous studies, I study how people make trade-
offs when dividing educational resources, and how people prefer to distribute
limited funds between different types of learners.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on social preferences (Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Cappelen, Drange Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2007;
Cappelen, Falch, and Tungodden, 2020; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Konow, 2000, 2003).4 This literature has focused almost exclu-
sively on preferences over distribution of income. I extend the literature to the
education policy domain by having people distribute educational resources be-
tween learners. In line with the previous literature, the present study shows that
efficiency concerns are often assigned less weight than concerns for inequality
(Almås, Cappelen, and Tungodden, 2020). Finally, I inform the important issue
of how to handle inequalities that arise from individual differences in natural
ability. In contrast to previous findings, where inequalities due to differences in
natural ability are considered fair (Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2010),
I find that, in the education domain, people prefer to reduce inequalities that
arise as a result of differences in natural learning ability.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the participants and
the experimental design, Section 3 outlines the main empirical strategy, Sec-
tion 4 reports the results, and Section 5 concludes.
4Other articles studying social preferences and impartial behavior are, e.g., Andreoni, Ay-
din, Barton, Bernheim, and Naecker (2020); Bortolotti, Soraperra, Sutter, and Zoller (2017);
Cappelen, Falch, Huang, and Tungodden (2019a); Cappelen et al. (2019b); Rodriguez-Lara and
Moreno-Garrido (2012).
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2 Participants and Experimental Design
To collect experimental data on a general population sample, I combine the ex-
pertise and resources of an international data-collection agency and two NGOs
that offer one-to-one tutoring programs. In the following, I explain the recruit-
ment of participants and the implementation of the distributive decisions, before
I outline the design.
2.1 Participants and Implementation
The participants were recruited in December 2017 using the data-collection
agency Research Now.5 I recruited 2,001 US participants (18+ years old) who
are nationally representative on observable characteristics (gender, age, and ge-
ography). The participants were randomly allocated to four different treatments.
Table 1 provides an overview of the background characteristics of the partici-
pants and a comparison with US census data. The share of males in the sample
is 0.491 and the median age is 45 years. The sample is heterogenous in terms
of education and income, with 33% of the sample having only completed high-
school education or less, and with a median gross yearly household income of
$45,000. The share of persons reporting that they would vote Republican if
there was an election tomorrow is 0.376 (the alternatives to Republican were
Democratic or other). The share of people who have children is 0.640. The
ethnic diversity in participants’ neighborhoods, as measured by the share of
non-whites in the median neighborhood, is 0.282. The median school quality
in their districts, as measured by the average mean third-grade mathematics test
scores in 2013, is 3.197.6 Compared to the data from the US Census Bureau,
we observe that the sample is representative when it comes to gender, age, and
geography. The median income is a bit lower and the educational attainment
is slightly higher in the sample than in the US, while the median neighborhood
characteristics for ethnic diversity and school quality mirror the medians in the
5They were sampled from the Research Now online panel, managed to be representative of
the US population with respect to basic demographics. No data delivered by Research Now was
excluded from the analysis in this paper.
6The neighborhood characteristics are based on coupling the participant ZIP-codes with in-
formation from the Opportunity Atlas, which are pre-specified for exploratory analysis. Details
on the coupling are provided in Section A.3.2.
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US as a whole.7
[Table 1 about here]
2.2 Experimental Design, Base Treatment
The participants distributed actual educational resources between anonymous
students with different learning abilities. They divided 12 hours of one-to-one
tutoring between a student classified as a quick learner and a student classified
as a slow learner. To control beliefs about characteristics correlated with learn-
ing abilities, the participants were informed that the pair of students were both
middle-school students from the US, from economically disadvantaged fami-
lies, and that they were either two boys or two girls.8 Finally, the participants
were informed that some decisions regarding the allocation of tutoring would
be randomly selected for implementation (five per cent). They did not receive
information about how the decisions would be implemented. The experimen-
tal design allows me to identify how a general population sample of Americans
distributes actual educational resources between real students, depending on
whether the students are quick or slow learners.
The selected decisions were implemented in collaboration with two US-
based NGOs. Both organizations focus on students from economically disad-
vantaged families in the US, earmarking the experimental incentives to provide
one-to-one tutoring for middle-school students with this background, and ac-
cording to gender as needed. The first organization, SMART, implemented
the tutoring allocated to quick learners. SMART has a tutoring program for
highly motivated middle-school students with strong academic potential (iden-
tified by their teachers) (https://www.thesmartprogram.org/). The
second organization, Learn To Be, implemented the tutoring allocated to the
slow learners. Learn To Be identified the learners who take more time and learn
7The main results presented in this paper are robust to probability weighting based on income
and education.
8To elicit information on beliefs about the quick and slow learners’ educational outcomes, I
conducted an exploratory follow-up study with one thousand US adults recruited in an identical
manner. They were presented with the same information about the two students as in the base
treatment and asked about the two students’ expected grade point averages (GPAs) as they leave
middle school. The participants on average believed that the quick learner would do better than
the US average (GPA of 3.31), and that the slow learner would do worse than the US average
(GPA of 2.26). Detailed instructions are provided in Appendix A.4.
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more slowly among their applicants, based on parent descriptions (https:
//learntobe.org/). To minimize the influence on distributive behavior
from beliefs about the two organisations, the participants did not receive infor-
mation on how the tutoring would be implemented.
2.3 Treatment Variations
To identify causally whether beliefs about cost efficiency and beliefs about the
motivation of the learners impact the distributive decision, I implemented a 2x2
experimental design, in which I varied the following factors:
• Whether the participant was informed that the quick learner is highly mo-
tivated.
• Whether there was an added cost (efficiency loss) associated with dis-
tributing tutoring to the slow learner.
This 2x2 design allows me to study how people trade off educational resources
between quick and slow learners, and whether information about relative mo-
tivation and cost efficiency matters when making this trade-off. An alternative
strategy for the motivation treatment would have been also to manipulate the
information about the slow learner, but this was not feasible given the limits of
the NGOs implementing the tutoring. The additional cost associated with dis-
tributing tutoring to the slow learner was implemented by decreasing the amount
allocated to the quick learner by two hours for every hour allocated to the slow
learner. In a between-individual design, the participants were randomly allo-
cated to one of the treatments.
[Table 2 about here]
I provide the instructions given to the participants in T1 (Base) in Appendix
A.3.3 and list the treatment variations subsequently. The word ‘girls’ is replaced
with ‘boys’ for half of the sample. As pre-specified, I collapse the data within
each of the four main treatments and disregard whether the distributive deci-
sions were made for two boys or two girls, because I do not find evidence of a
difference in distributive behavior based on the gender of the learners.9
9Table A.1 presents a balance test, which shows that the four treatments are not significantly
different from each other with respect to the pre-specified background characteristics gender,
political preference, age, having children, and having low socioeconomic status.
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2.4 Survey on Beliefs and Attitudes
To study underlying mechanisms, the participants were asked questions about
their beliefs and attitudes after they had made their allocation decisions. Three
questions concerned the allocation decision they had just made: (1) The main
reason for their choice, (2) their beliefs about the relative motivations of the two
students, and (3) their beliefs about the relative improvement of the students,
given the same amount of tutoring. The next two questions were asked about
two hypothetical individuals, a quick and a slow learner who have finished their
education, but are equally distant from their full learning potential: (4) Which
learner has a greater welfare loss in life and (5) which learner is associated with
a greater welfare loss to society? In the final question, (6), the participants
were asked to what extent they agreed with the following statement: “The US
government should have a particular focus on helping low-performing children
in school”.
Question (1) is explorative and is used to elicit the main reason for each
respondent’s resource allocation, while question (2) is included to test whether
the motivation treatments changed beliefs about the relative motivation of the
learners. Questions (3), (4), and (5) relate to efficiency arguments and concern
narrow and broad views on returns to education for society and for the two indi-
viduals. Question (6) is elicited to test the external validity of the experimental
design. The full set of instructions for the beliefs and attitude questions are
provided in Appendix A.3.4.
3 Empirical Strategy
The following section outlines the main empirical strategy. I specified the empir-
ical strategy in a pre-analysis plan, registered at the AEA RCT Registry before
the data collection.
3.1 Main Analysis
In the main analysis, I identify treatment estimates relative to the base treatment,
with and without control variables. The main outcome variable is the share of
tutoring assigned to the quick learner, and I use the following empirical specifi-
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cation:
ui = α0 + α1Efficiencyi + α2Motivationi+
α3Efficiencyi ∗Motivationi +α4Xi + εi
(1)
where ui is the share allocated by participant i to the quick learner, andEfficiencyi
and Motivationi are indicators referring to participant i being in one of the ef-
ficiency treatments (T2 or T4) or one of the motivation treatments (T3 or T4),
respectively. Efficiencyi ∗Motivationi is the interaction between the two. Xi
is a vector of control variables, and εi is an idiosyncratic error term. I report
the regression with and without control variables. For all specifications, I use
robust standard errors. I estimate (1) for the full sample of participants. As an
alternative outcome variable, I use an indicator variable for assigning at least
half of the tutoring to the quick learner.
Using this approach, I can identify the causal effect of i) introducing an
added cost associated with distributing tutoring to the slow learner (α1), ii) the
participant learning that the quick learner is highly motivated (α2), and iii) the
interaction of the two (α3).
3.2 Heterogeneity, Background Characteristics
I study whether there are particularly strong treatment effects on the allocation
decision in some subgroups. I focus on the following background character-
istics: gender, political orientation, age, whether the participant has children,
and socioeconomic status based on income and education level. Regression
(2) exemplifies the heterogeneity analyses by comparing the treatment effect of




where ui is the share allocated by participant i to the quick learner, Efficiencyi
is an indicator for participant i being in the efficiency treatment, Femalei is an
indicator for participant i being female, Femalei × Efficiencyi is an interac-
tion term for participant i being female and belonging to the efficiency treat-
ment, Xi is a vector of control variables, and εi is an idiosyncratic error term. I
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estimate (2) for the sample of participants in T1 (Base) and T2 (Efficiency). I
use corresponding regression equations for the other dimensions of heterogene-
ity.
I replace Efficiencyi and Femalei ×Efficiencyi with Motivationi and
Femalei ×Motivationi in (2) for the heterogeneity analysis of the treatment
effect of T3 (Motivation) compared to T1 (Base), using instead the sample of
participants in T1 (Base) and T3 (Motivation).
4 Results
First, I provide an overview of how the participants distribute educational re-
sources between quick and slow learners. Then, I turn to the treatment analysis
and causally identify the effects of varying cost efficiency and the motivation
of the learners on the distribution of educational resources. Next, I provide a
heterogeneity analysis based on the background characteristics, before finally
analyzing the participants’ beliefs to shed further light on underlying mecha-
nisms.
4.1 The Distributive Decisions
Figure 1 provides an overview of the distributive decisions in the base treatment,
using the share of tutoring assigned to the quick learner. We observe that the
majority, 70.4%, give priority to the slow learner by assigning more than half
of the tutoring to the slow learner. The rest of the sample is split between those
distributing the tutoring equally between the two learners (17.6% of the sample)
and those assigning most of it to the quick learner (12% of the sample). The
median participant assigns 33.3% of the tutoring to the quick learner, and the
average share assigned to the quick learner is 36.8%.10
[Figure 1 about here]
Result 1: The majority of participants, 70.4%, prioritize the slow learner
when distributing tutoring between a quick and a slow learner. The median
participant assigns 33.3% to the quick learner.
10Figure A.1 provides an overview of the distributive decisions for the full sample, and Fig-
ure A.2 provides an overview of the distributive decisions by treatment.
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4.2 Main Analyses
Now, I turn to the regression analysis of the treatment manipulations. Table 3 re-
ports treatment estimates relative to the base treatment, with and without control
variables. The outcome variable in columns 1-3 is the share of tutoring assigned
to the quick learner. The outcome variable in columns 4-6 is an indicator vari-
able for assigning at least half of the tutoring to the quick learner.
[Table 3 about here]
In treatments T2 and T4, I manipulate the cost efficiency of allocating tutor-
ing to the slow learner, making allocations to the slow learner more costly. We
observe that when there is an added cost associated with allocating tutoring to
the slow learner, the average share assigned to the quick learner is increased by
15.8% (0.058, p < 0.001, Table 3, column 1). The result remains practically un-
changed when I include background variables for gender, political orientation,
income, age, education, whether the participants have children (Table 3, column
2), and neighborhood characteristics (Table 3, column 3), and is robust to mul-
tiple hypothesis adjustment (p = 0.001, Table A.6). The qualitative effect also
remains robust to using an indicator for assigning at least half of the tutoring to
the quick learner as the outcome variable. The participants are 12.8 percentage
points more likely to assign at least half of the tutoring to the quick learner in
the efficiency treatments compared with the base treatment (p < 0.001).11
In treatments T3 and T4, I manipulate beliefs concerning the relative moti-
vations of the two learners. In Table 3, we observe that, when the participants
know that the quick learner is a highly motivated student, they assign a larger
share of the tutoring to the quick learner compared to participants in the base
treatment (0.026, p = 0.066, or 7.1%, column 1). The result remains robust
to the inclusion of the pre-specified background variables (Table 3, column 2)
and to using an indicator for assigning at least half of the tutoring to the quick
learner as the outcome variable (0.055, p = 0.062, column 4). However, the
effect is relatively small and not robust to multiple hypothesis adjustment (p =
11To study whether the change in behavior is a result of shifted beliefs concerning the stu-
dents’ relative improvement from the tutoring, I compare beliefs about the relative improvement
in the treatments with and without an added cost. I find no evidence of such a shift in beliefs
(p = 0.620).
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0.115, Table A.6), nor to the exploratory analysis including neighborhood char-
acteristics (p = 0.104, Table 3, column 3).
To shed light on underlying mechanisms, I study how beliefs concerning the
relative motivations of the two learners are shifted by informing participants that
the quick learner is a highly motivated student. I find that the beliefs are shifted
by 0.186 standard deviations in the direction of believing the quick learner is
(even) more motivated than the slow learner (p < 0.000, Table A.2, column 1).
Furthermore, I identify the effect of the motivation treatments on participants’
beliefs about the two learners’ relative potential to improve their school per-
formance given the same amount of tutoring. I do not find a significant effect
(p = 0.421, Table A.2, column 3). Just as in the base treatment, only about
one fifth of the participants in the motivation treatments believe that the slow
learners would improve their school performance more than the quick learners.
The majority instead believes that the quick learners would improve the most.
Result 2: The participants assign a larger share of tutoring to the quick
learner as it becomes less cost-efficient to assign tutoring to the slow learner.
There is also suggestive evidence that they increase the share to the quick learner
when they learn that the quick learner is a highly motivated student.
In the combined treatment, I introduce both the added cost associated with
allocating tutoring to the slow learner, as in T2, and information on the quick
learner being highly motivated, as in T3. I do not find an interaction effect
from combining the motivation and cost efficiency manipulations (-0.031, p =
0.152, column 1, Table 3). The result is robust to controlling for background
characteristics, and to using the indicator for whether at least half of the tutoring
is allocated to the quick learner as the outcome variable (0.002, p = 0.963,
column 3).
Result 3: The priority given to the slow learner is robust across all treat-
ments, even when it is not a cost-efficient way to allocate resources, and despite
participants’ beliefs that the quick learners are more motivated and more likely
to improve their school performance as a result of the tutoring.
From Table 3, we observe the correlation between observed background
characteristics and distributive behavior. In line with the literature on inequality
acceptance in the income domain (Almås et al., 2020; Cappelen et al., 2019b),
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we observe that females allocate a lower share to quick learners than do males
(-0.051, p < 0.001, column 2). We further observe that younger people and peo-
ple with low education distribute a larger share to the quick learners compared
to their counterparts (0.107, p < 0.001, 0.033, and p = 0.008, column 2). The
results on age and education are in line with findings from a survey of a gen-
eral population sample in Germany, which asks to what degree the participants
find educational inequality to be a problem (Lergetporer et al., 2020). In terms
of political preferences, we observe a political consensus for the priority of the
slow learner (0.016, p = 0.150, column 2). This is noticeable, given that Repub-
licans are often found to accept more inequality than Democrats (Almås et al.,
2020; Cappelen et al., 2019b). The result suggests that there is more political
consensus for reducing inequalities in education, compared to inequalities in the
income domain.
The average allocation decision does not vary significantly across income
groups (above and below the median in the sample, -0.019, p = 0.155, column
2), between people having children and not (-0.019, p = 0.120, column 2), nor
in the explorative analysis between people from neighborhoods with learning
outcomes above and below median (0.003, p = 0.795, column 3). However,
I do find that people from more diverse neighborhoods assign a larger share
to the quick learner, compared with people from less diverse neighborhoods
(0.046 p < 0.001, columns 3). The correlation results are largely robust to
the outcome variable being the indicator for giving less to the quick learner,
with one exception; the difference between people with and without children is
significant using this indicator variable (-0.045, p = 0.052, column 5).
4.3 Heterogeneity Analyses
In Table 4, I report the heterogeneity analyses, as specified in (2), focusing on
the share allocated to the quick learner. As pre-specified, I compare how the
allocation decisions in T1 (Base) and T2 (Efficiency), and T1 (Base) and T3
(Motivation) depend on gender, political preference, age, having children, and
socioeconomic status.
[Table 4 about here]
I find that the effect of the efficiency treatment is strikingly robust across
all subgroups. Within each subgroup, participants in the efficiency treatment
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assign a higher share to the quick learner, compared with participants in the base
treatment (columns 1-5, Panel A). Moreover, I do not find any robust interaction
effects.12 Noticeably, all subgroups assign a larger share of tutoring to the slow
learner even when there is an added cost associated with doing so (Panel A,
Table 4). This is also true in the heterogeneity analysis, including the proxies for
the quality of education and diversity in the participants’ neighborhoods (Panel
A, Table A.3).
For the motivation treatment, I do not find significant interaction effects.
All estimates are positive, meaning that information on the quick learner being
highly motivated leads the participants to assign less to the quick learner. How-
ever, the effects are relatively small and only significant for participants with
children, where the treatment effect is 0.029 (p = 0.081, Panel B, Table 4),
and for participants from neighborhoods which are less diverse than the median
neighborhood (0.038, p = 0.035, Panel B, Table A.3).13
Result 4: In all subgroups, we observe a positive and highly significant
effect of the efficiency treatment on the share of tutoring allocated to the quick
learner. For the motivation treatment, the estimates are positive in all subgroups,
but largely not significant. There are no strong interaction effects. Despite the
treatment effects, slow learners are on average prioritized in all subgroups.
4.4 Welfare Considerations
An important question is whether welfare considerations are important for the
distribution of educational resources, or whether the participants solely focus
on human capital effects. To provide more information on this issue, I elicited
beliefs about two welfare considerations that may influence the participants’ dis-
tributive choices: i) maximizing welfare in society; and ii) maximizing the wel-
fare of the two individuals involved. The societal welfare loss clearly includes
the individual welfare losses, but also captures effects on the rest of society.
12The results in Table 4 suggest that the effect of the efficiency treatment is particularly strong
among participants with low socioeconomic status compared to participants with higher socioe-
conomic status (0.068, p = 0.085, column 5, Panel A), but the difference is not robust to multiple
hypothesis adjustments (p = 0.359, Table A.8).
13The heterogeneity analysis for T1 (Base) vs. T4 (Efficiency and Motivation) is reported
in Table A.4. The treatment effect is relatively robust across all subgroups, and there are no
statistically significant interaction effects.
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While quick and slow learners who do not reach their full learning potentials
may suffer individual welfare losses, society as a whole may suffer additional
welfare losses from payments for unemployment benefits, lost tax revenues, less
innovation, and so on.
To elicit beliefs about the two welfare considerations, I asked the participants
about their beliefs regarding two hypothetical individuals, a quick and a slow
learner, both of whom have finished their education, but who are equally distant
from their full learning potential. The participants were asked i) which learner
would be associated with a greater welfare loss to society and ii) which learner
would experience a greater welfare loss in life.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 provides an overview of the self-reported beliefs for the full sam-
ple.14 Panel a) shows that half of the participants believe that the societal welfare
loss would be the same independently of whether it were quick or slow learn-
ers not reaching their full learning potential. The rest of the participants are
relatively evenly spread between those believing that there is a greater societal
welfare loss associated with the quick learners not reaching their learning po-
tentials (25.8%) and those who consider that the greatest loss is associated with
slow learners failing to reach their learning potential (25.4%). Panel b) shows
that relatively few participants (21.2%) believe that quick learners who fail to
reach their full learning potentials will suffer a greater welfare loss compared
with slow learners not doing so. Almost half of the sample believe that the indi-
vidual welfare losses will be the same for the two, while 33.4% believe that the
slow learners will experience a greater welfare loss. In essence, the participants
hold similar beliefs about the welfare losses to society and the welfare losses to
the two individuals, except more participants believe that the slow learners will
suffer greater individual welfare losses than quick learners from not reaching
their full learning potentials, compared to their beliefs over the relative societal
welfare losses. The increase is 5.6% relative to societal welfare, or 0.168 (p <
0.001, paired t-test) on the 5-point scale on which both questions were asked.
As pre-specified, I analyze whether these beliefs are associated with the par-
ticipants’ distributive behavior using the sample in the base treatment. I identify
14The results are balanced across treatments. In joint F-tests with the reference category being
the base treatment (T1), the elicited beliefs are not significantly different from each other across
the four main treatments (Prob>F = 0.3073 and Prob>F = 0.2573, respectively).
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whether there is a difference in allocation decisions between participants who
believe that quick learners will suffer more, or as much as slow learners when
they do not reach their full learning potentials, compared to participants who do
not believe this. Table 5 provides results showing that the distributive behavior
is significantly associated with beliefs about individual welfare losses, and that
participants assign more educational resources to the individuals whom they be-
lieve will suffer more from not reaching their full learning potentials (0.066, p =
0.001, column 1). At the same time, there is on average no association between
the allocations and beliefs about the relative welfare losses to society (0.027,
p = 0.211, column 3).15
Result 5: The participants allocate more to the learner whom they believe
will suffer more from not reaching his/her full learning potential, which suggests
that allocations are affected by individual welfare considerations. There is no
strong correlation between allocations and beliefs about the relative societal
welfare losses.
The results suggest that people’s preferences regarding the distribution of
educational resources between students with different learning abilities are not
only affected by cost efficiency, but also by a concern for the individual welfare
of the students involved. In particular, participants who believe that slow learn-
ers will suffer greater welfare losses than quick learners from not reaching their
full learning potential assign more educational resources to the slow learners.
[Figure 3 about here]
This interpretation is mirrored in the reasoning the respondents themselves
give for their resource allocation. Directly after their distributive decision, each
respondent answered the open question, “What was the main reason for your
choice? Please explain.” A total of 1622 participants provided a single main
reason for the resource allocation, which fits one of four pre-determined cate-
gories. Figure 3 provides the categorized results.16 Fully 70% report that the
main reason for their allocation decision was to reduce inequality in outcomes
between the students. An example is the participant who stated that “The slow
learner takes more time to learn; therefore, he should receive more time to be
15Table 5 also provides the results using the full sample.
16Appendix A.5.2 provides details on the categorization.
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taught.” This group of participants assigned on average 72.9% of the educa-
tional resources to the slow learner. Reducing inequality in inputs was the main
reason for 22% who, in line with their reasoning, assigned on average 1/2 of
the tutoring to each learner. An example of a main reason in this category is
the following: “Each child, regardless of their educational learning abilities, de-
serves the same amount of time.” The final two categories; efficiency concerns
in terms of maximizing human capital and/or societal welfare; and respondents’
own experience as a quick or slow learner, are only ascribed to by 4% and 3%,
respectively. While the latter group split the resources equally on average (both
quick and slow learners drew upon their own experience), the participants who
state that maximizing efficiency was their main reason constitute the only group
that prioritizes quick learners, on average allocating 71.4% of the resources to
the quick learners. While I cannot exclude that the results are driven by a need
for consistency, they map well with the finding that the priority of the slow learn-
ers may partly be driven by a preference for reducing inequalities in outcomes
between the two learners.
5 Concluding Remarks
People’s preferences for human capital investment policies are fundamental for
democratic societies. At the same time, these preferences remain largely un-
known and understudied. The present article reports from the first experiment
on people’s preferences for how society should distribute educational resources.
The experiment includes a general population sample of over 2,000 Americans,
where each individual allocates 12 hours of one-to-one tutoring between a quick
and a slow learner, recruited via US NGOs. To study mechanisms, I handle be-
liefs in three ways: i) I keep important background characteristics identical be-
tween the two students, ii) I exogenously vary information about the motivation
of the learners and the cost efficiency of assigning tutoring to the slow learner,
and iii) I elicit beliefs about the two learners and about efficiency arguments
which can influence the allocation decisions.
I find that people give priority to slow learners, assigning them two thirds
of the educational resources, on average. The quick learners are consequently
assigned one third of the educational resources, which is a smaller, but non-
trivial share. While I causally identify that cost efficiency and the motivation of
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the learners matter for the trade-off of resources between the two students, the
priority of the slow learners remains robust across treatments. On average, the
participants believe that the quick learners are more motivated in school, and
more likely to improve their school performance with tutoring compared to the
slow learners. The participants also believe that the welfare losses to society
associated with the two types of students being equally distant from their full
learning potential are relatively similar in size. In sum, I do not find evidence
to support that the priority of slow learners is primarily driven by concerns for
cost efficiency, for maximizing school performance, or for minimizing the costs
to society associated with the learners not reaching their full learning potentials.
However, I do find that the large majority of the participants believe slow learn-
ers will suffer at least as great individual welfare losses as the quick learners
from not reaching their full learning potentials. Moreover, I find that participants
who hold this belief prioritize slow learners to a greater extent when distributing
educational resources. The findings provide important insights into the present
policy debate about the optimal design of human capital investments by shed-
ding light on how people think society should prioritize educational resources
between different types of learners.
To learn more about whether the allocation of educational resources in the
experiment is predictive of attitudes to public policies, I asked the participants
about the extent to which they agreed with the following statement: “The US
government should have a particular focus on helping low-performing children
in school.” In line with prioritizing slow learners in the allocations, the ma-
jority of the participants agreed with this statement (73.3%). Moreover, I find
that participants who assigned more tutoring to slow learners were more likely
to support a particular focus on helping low-performing children in the US (-
0.122, p < 0.001, Table A.5). The results are consistent with the allocation
decisions in the experiment capturing underlying preferences towards relevant
public policies in the US.
The present paper introduces a new experimental approach, combining the
infrastructures of NGOs and data-collection agencies to let general population
samples distribute actual educational resources between real students. The ap-
proach opens up many avenues of research related to preferences for human
capital investment policies. Examples are studies identifying how these pref-
erences differ between societies, and how they might change across different
20
education levels. Identifying how people’s preferences change in mixed-sex set-
tings, where either a male is lagging behind or a female is lagging behind, can
provide further insight on the boy crisis. Controlled variation of socioeconomic
backgrounds can shed light on how people’s preferences depend on the students’
backgrounds. This new experimental approach also opens avenues for future re-
search in other policy domains, such as the identification of people’s preferences
for health, elderly care and equal rights policies. Knowledge of people’s prefer-
ences for how to distribute resources in society is fundamental for democracies,
crucial in itself, and vital for assisting decision-making processes, as well as the
implementation of influential policies that affect society.
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Note: The figure gives an overview of the share of tutoring assigned to the quick learner
by the respondents in the base treatment (by fraction).
26
Figure 2: Beliefs


















































































Note: The figure gives an overview of the elicited beliefs related to welfare considera-
tions for the full sample (by fraction). Panel (a): The participants were asked about the
relative welfare loss to society associated with two hypothetical students, a quick and a
slow learner, being equally distant from their full learning potential. They answered on
a scale from 1-5 from “Much more welfare loss to society when the quick learner does
not reach it” to “Much more welfare loss to society when the slow learner does not
reach it.” Panel (b): The participants were asked an equivalent question with respect to
individual welfare loss, and were given the equivalent scale of potential answers.
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Note: The figure shows the mean share assigned to the quick learner by main reason
(by fraction). The sample are participants who have provided a single main reason for
the resource allocation, which fit one of the pre-determined categories (a total of 1622
participants). The categories are from left to right: i) Reducing inequality in outcomes,
ii) Reducing inequality in inputs, iii) Efficiency concerns in terms of maximizing human
capital and societal welfare, and iv) Own experience as slow or quick learner. Details
on the categorization procedures are provided in Appendix A.5.2.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Main sample US











High school or less 0.334 0.407





Republican (share) 0.376 0.270
Have children (share) 0.640
Neighborhood characteristics:
Share non-white (median) 0.282 0.266
Mean 3rd grade math score (median) 3.197 3.22
Note: The table displays descriptive statistics for the main sample in the
left column, and for the US in the right column. The descriptive statis-
tics for the main sample are based on self-reported and ZIP-code-based data.
The income variable is the yearly household income in USD (gross in-
come before taxes are deducted) and given in standard categories where I
use the mid-point in the category. A participant is classified as Republi-
can if he or she would have voted for the Republican party. The full in-
structions, including a listing of income categories and definition of neigh-
borhood characteristics, are provided in Appendix A.3.2. The share of
males in the US, and the population data by region (+18) is 2017 data
from the US Census Bureau, Population Division, and so is the median
age (+18) (https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217 and
https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2017/demo/popest/nation-detail.html, re-
spectively). US income and education data are based on the US Census Bureau,
Current Population Survey, together with the 2016 and 2017 Annual Social and
Economic Supplement. The question concerning having children or not is asked
differently than the question on the same topic in the US household survey. US
neighborhood characteristics are taken from the Opportunity Atlas (“Neighbor-




Base T1: n=500 T2: n=493
Motivation T3: n=507 T4: n=501
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Table 3: Treatment effects, interactions
Share to quick learner
≥ 0.5 ≥ 0.5 ≥ 0.5
Efficiency 0.058∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Motivation 0.026∗ 0.023∗ 0.023 0.055∗ 0.051∗ 0.050∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Efficiency* -0.031 -0.035 -0.034 0.002 -0.010 -0.009
Motivation (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
Female -0.051∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.052∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023)
Republican 0.016 0.019∗ 0.012 0.017
(0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.022)
Low age 0.107∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.022)
Child -0.019 -0.015 -0.045∗ -0.040∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023)
Low income -0.019 -0.019 -0.025 -0.025
(0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.025)
Low education 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗





Constant 0.368∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.035) (0.038)
Observations 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
R2 0.009 0.066 0.074 0.021 0.067 0.072
Note: The table reports OLS regressions on the full sample, with the share assigned to the quick learner as
the outcome variable in the first three columns. The outcome variable in the last three columns is an indicator
variable for assigning at least half of the tutoring to the quick learner. Efficiency is an indicator for the partici-
pant being in one of the efficiency treatments, T2 or T4, with an added cost associated with assigning tutoring
to the slow learner. Motivation is an indicator for the participant being in one of the motivation treatments,
T3 and T4, receiving information of the quick learner being highly motivated. Efficiency*Motivation is the
interaction of Efficiency and Motivation. Female is an indicator variable for being female. Republican is an
indicator for being Republican. Low age is an indicator for being below 45 years old (the median age in the
sample). Child is an indicator for the participant having at least one child. Low income is an indicator for
having an income below $45,000 (the median income in the sample). Low education is an indicator for the
participant’s highest educational attainment being high school or less. Non-white neighborhood is an indi-
cator for the participant’s neighborhood being less diverse than the median neighborhood (2010 Decennial
Census). Low-score neighborhood is an indicator for the participant’s neighborhood having a lower mean
3rd grade math test score than the median neighborhood (measured in 2013). Region indicators Northeast,
Midwest, and West are also included in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6. Standard errors in parentheses, where * p
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are provided in Table
A.6. The results are qualitatively robust to probability weighting the sample, making it representative on
income and education. The results are robust to selecting control variables from the larger set of variables
using machine learning (pdslasso by Ahrens, Hansen, and Schaffer (2018)).
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Table 4: Heterogeneity, background characteristics
A. Efficiency Share to quick learner
Gender Politics Age Child SES All
Efficiency 0.076∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.044









Efficiency*Low SES 0.068∗ 0.067∗
(0.039) (0.039)
Constant 0.363∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026)
Included controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear combination 0.044∗∗ 0.039∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(Efficiency + Interaction) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.018) (0.036)
Observations 993 993 993 993 993 993
R2 0.076 0.076 0.077 0.075 0.078 0.084
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B. Motivation Share to quick learner
Gender Politics Age Child SES All
Motivation 0.016 0.022 0.014 0.014 0.019 -0.009









Motivation*Low SES 0.017 0.018
(0.035) (0.036)
Constant 0.362∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026)
Included controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear combination 0.031 0.027 0.034 0.029∗ 0.036
(Motivation + Interaction) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.017) (0.032)
Observations 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007
R2 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.053
Note: The table reports OLS regressions using the sample of spectators in T1 (Base)
and T2 (Efficiency) in Panel A, and T1 (Base) and T3 (Motivation) in Panel B. The
outcome variable is the share assigned to the quick learner. Efficiency, Motivation, Female,
Republican, Low age, Child, Low SES and region controls are indicators defined in
Table 3 and Table A.1. Efficiency*Female, Efficiency*Republican, Efficiency*Low age,
Efficiency*Child, and Efficiency*Low SES are interactions between the respective char-
acteristic and Efficiency. Motivation*Female, Motivation*Republican, Motivation*Low
age, Motivation*Child, and Motivation*Low SES are interactions between the respective
characteristic and Motivation. Standard errors in parentheses, where * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are provided in
Tables A.7 – A.10. The results are largely robust to probability weighting the sample,
making it representative on income and education.
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Table 5: Correlations, beliefs
Share to quick learner
Base All Base All Base All
Quick more or equal 0.066∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
individual loss (0.020) (0.011) (0.022) (0.012)
Quick more or equal 0.027 0.020∗ -0.009 -0.009
societal loss (0.022) (0.012) (0.024) (0.013)
Constant 0.308∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.018) (0.034) (0.019) (0.034) (0.019)
Included controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 500 2001 500 2001 500 2001
R2 0.082 0.071 0.064 0.058 0.082 0.071
Note: The table reports OLS regressions using the sample of participants in the base treatment (columns
1, 3, and 5) and the full sample (columns 2, 4, and 6). The outcome variable is the share assigned to the
quick learner. Quick more or equal to individual loss is an indicator for believing that the quick learner has
more or as much individual welfare loss compared to the slow learner when they are both equally distant
from having achieved their full learning potential. Quick more or equal to societal loss is an indicator for
believing that there is more or the same societal welfare loss associated with the quick learner compared to
the slow learner being equally distant from their full learning potential. Female, Republican, Low age and




A.1 Figures and Tables
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Note: The figure shows the mean share assigned to the quick learner in all of the treat-
ments seen together (by fraction).
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Table A.2: Beliefs about relative motivation and improvement
Relative Relative Relative Relative
motivation (std) motivation (std) improvement (std) improvement (std)
Motivation -0.186∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ 0.036 0.031









Low income 0.017 -0.005
(0.059) (0.055)
Low education 0.040 0.140∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.050)
Constant -0.011 -0.010 0.046 -0.014
(0.033) (0.071) (0.032) (0.070)
Observations 2001 2001 2001 2001
R2 0.008 0.028 0.000 0.018
Note: The table reports robust OLS regressions with beliefs about relative motivation levels of the quick
and the slow learner as the outcome variable in columns 1 and 2, and beliefs about relative improvement
in columns 3 and 4. I use the full sample. The empirical strategy for measuring the treatment effect
on beliefs is provided in Appendix A.5.1. Motivation is an indicator for the participants belonging to
either of the motivation treatments, T3 Motivation or T4 Efficiency and Motivation. Beliefs about the
relative motivation levels between the two students are elicited in Question 2 on a scale from 1-5, where
1 is “The quick learner is much more motivated”, 2 is “The quick learner is somewhat more motivated”,
3 is “They are equally motivated”, 4 is “The slow learner is somewhat more motivated”, and 5 is “The
slow learner is much more motivated.” Beliefs about the students’ relative improvement with the same
amount of tutoring are elicited in Question 3 on a scale from 1-5, where 1 is “The quick learner would
improve much more”, 2 is “The quick learner would improve somewhat more”, 3 is “They would
improve equally much”, 4 is “The slow learner would improve somewhat more”, and 5 is “The slow
learner would improve much more.” I consider them continuous and standardize these variables by, for
each variable, subtracting the base group mean and dividing by the base group standard deviation for
each observation. Female, Republican, Low age and Child, Low income, Low education, and region
controls are indicators defined in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses, where * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01. The results are largely robust to instead using indicator variables for having an
answer above or below the median on questions 2 and 3.
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Table A.3: Heterogeneity, background characteristics
A. Efficiency Share to quick learner
Gender Politics Age Child SES Diversity Score All
Efficiency 0.075∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.021















Constant 0.317∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031)
Included controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear combination 0.043∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(Eff + Interac.) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.017) (0.035) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 993 993 993 993 993 993 993 993
R2 0.095 0.095 0.096 0.094 0.098 0.094 0.095 0.104
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B. Motivation Share to quick learner
Gender Politics Age Child SES Diversity Score All
Motivation 0.015 0.020 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.038∗∗ 0.024 0.001















Constant 0.332∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030)
Included controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear combination 0.032 0.029 0.036 0.028∗ 0.038 0.009 0.023
(Mot + Interac.) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.032) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007
R2 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.062 0.064
Note: The table reports OLS regressions using the sample of participants in T1 (Base) and T2 (Efficiency) in Panel
A, and T1 (Base) and T3 (Motivation) in Panel B. The outcome variable is the share assigned to the quick learner.
Efficiency, Motivation, Female, Republican, Low age, Child, Low SES, Non-white, Low-score, and region controls
are indicators defined in Table 3 and Table A.1. Efficiency*Female, Efficiency*Republican, Efficiency*Low age,
Efficiency*Child, Efficiency*Low SES, Efficiency*Non-white, and Efficiency*Low-score are interactions between
the respective characteristic and Efficiency. Motivation*Female, Motivation*Republican, Motivation*Low age,
Motivation*Child, Motivation*Low SES, Motivation*Non-white, and Motivation*Low-score are interactions between
the respective characteristic and Motivation. Standard errors in parentheses, where * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are provided in Tables A.7 – A.10.
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Table A.4: Heterogeneity combined treatment, background characteristics
Share to quick learner
Gender Politics Age Child SES All
EffMot 0.051∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.031 0.020 0.058∗∗∗ 0.004









EffMot*Low SES -0.037 -0.034
(0.037) (0.037)
Constant 0.342∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026)
Included controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear combination 0.046∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.021
(EffMot + Interaction) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.018) (0.033)
Observations 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001
R2 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.068
Note: The table reports OLS regressions using the sample of participants in T1 (Base) and T4
(Efficiency and Motivation). The outcome variable is the share assigned to the quick learner.
EffMot, Female, Republican, Low age, Child, Low SES, and region controls are indicators
defined in Table 3 and Table A.1. EffMot*Female, EffMot*Republican, EffMot*Low age, Eff-
Mot*Child, and EffMot*Low SES are interactions between the respective characteristic and
EffMot. Standard errors in parentheses, where * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: External validity results
Share to quick learner
Base All




Included controls Yes Yes
Observations 500 2001
R2 0.103 0.104
Note: The table reports OLS regressions using the
sample of participants in the base treatment in column
1 and the full sample in column 2. The outcome vari-
able is the share assigned to the quick learner. Support
for low-performers is an indicator for agreeing that
the US government should have a particular focus on
helping low-performing children in school. Female,
Republican, Low age, Child, Low income, Low edu-
cation, and region controls are included as controls
and are defined in Table 3.
42
A.2 Multiple Hypothesis Testing
I here report the p-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing. I calculate un-
adjusted p-values as bootstrap p-values following Davison and Hinkley (1997)
and compute p-values adjusted for stepdown multiple testing following the al-
gorithm proposed by Romano and Wolf (2016). Bootstrapping is done with
10,000 replications.





Base vs. efficiency 0.058 0.000 0.001
Base vs. motivation 0.026 0.068 0.115
Base vs. efficiency*motivation -0.031 0.154 0.154
Note: The multiple hypothesis adjustment is based on OLS regression specification (1) without control
variables. Column 1 reports the estimated treatment effects (the difference in the share assigned to the
quick learner). Column 2 reports the unadjusted p-values and column 3 reports the Romano-Wolf-adjusted
p-values.
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Male 0.076 0.001 0.006
Female 0.044 0.028 0.103
Non-Republican 0.073 0.000 0.003
Republican 0.039 0.083 0.103
High age 0.039 0.038 0.103
Low age 0.084 0.000 0.005
No child 0.060 0.034 0.103
Child(ren) 0.060 0.001 0.006
High SES 0.043 0.007 0.036
Low SES 0.111 0.001 0.012
Note: The multiple hypothesis adjustment is based on OLS regression specification (2), one for each
dimension: gender, political preference, age, having children and SES. The dependent variable is share
assigned to the quick learner. The sample is the individuals in T1 (Base) and T2 (Efficiency). Back-
ground characteristic indicators are defined in Table 3 and Table A.1 along with the included region
controls. Column 1 reports the estimated treatment effects (the difference in the share assigned to the
quick learner in T1 (Base) and T2 (Efficiency)). Column 2 reports the unadjusted p-values and column
3 reports the Romano-Wolf-adjusted p-values.
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Table A.8: Multiple hypothesis adjustments: Subgroup differences in treatment effect (share to
quick learner) T1 vs. T2
Differences Unadjusted Romano-Wolf-adjusted
p-values p-values
Females vs. males -0.032 0.300 0.603
Republicans vs. non-Republicans -0.033 0.270 0.603
Low age vs. high age 0.045 0.145 0.445
Child(ren) vs. no child -0.000 0.997 0.997
Low SES vs. high SES 0.068 0.084 0.359
Note: The multiple hypothesis adjustment is based on OLS regression specification (2), one for each dimension:
gender, political preference, age, having children and SES. The dependent variable is share assigned to the quick
learner. The sample is the individuals in T1 (Base) and T2 (Efficiency). Background characteristic indicators
are defined in Table 3 and Table A.1 along with the included region controls. Column 1 reports the estimated
subgroup differences in treatment effect (the difference in the share assigned to the quick learner in T1 (Base)
and T2 (Efficiency)). Column 2 reports the unadjusted p-values and column 3 reports the Romano-Wolf-adjusted
p-values.
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Male 0.016 0.411 0.744
Female 0.031 0.116 0.508
Non-Republican 0.022 0.231 0.674
Republican 0.027 0.202 0.674
High age 0.014 0.400 0.744
Low age 0.034 0.135 0.522
No child 0.014 0.562 0.744
Child(ren) 0.029 0.077 0.411
High SES 0.019 0.198 0.674
Low SES 0.036 0.261 0.674
Note: The multiple hypothesis adjustment is based on OLS regression specification (2), one for each
dimension: gender, political preference, age, having children, and SES. The dependent variable is
share assigned to the quick learner. The sample is the individuals in T1 (Base) and T3 (Motivation).
Background characteristic indicators are defined in Table 3 and Table A.1 along with the included
region controls. Column 1 reports the estimated treatment effects (the difference in the share assigned
to the quick learner in T1 (Base) and T3 (Motivation)). Column 2 reports the unadjusted p-values and
column 3 reports the Romano-Wolf-adjusted p-values.
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Table A.10: Multiple hypothesis adjustments: Subgroup differences in treatment effect (share
to quick learner) T1 vs. T3
Differences Unadjusted Romano-Wolf-adjusted
p-values p-values
Females vs. males 0.015 0.599 0.975
Republicans vs. non-Republicans 0.005 0.865 0.975
Low age vs. high age 0.020 0.482 0.975
Child(ren) vs. no child 0.015 0.611 0.975
Low SES vs. high SES 0.017 0.639 0.975
Note: The multiple hypothesis adjustment is based on OLS regression specification (2), one for each dimension:
gender, political preference, age, having children, and SES. The dependent variable is share assigned to the quick
learner. The sample is the individuals in T1 (Base) and T3 (Motivation). Background characteristic indicators
are defined in Table 3 and Table A.1 along with the included region controls. Column 1 reports the estimated
subgroup differences in treatment effect (the difference in the share assigned to the quick learner in T1 (Base)






Welcome to this research project. We appreciate your participation. This study
is a project conducted by FAIR/The Choice Lab at NHH Norwegian School of
Economics. The project is funded by several research institutions. Participants
are recruited via Research Now with the aim of surveying a representative sam-
ple of Americans.
Study
The study takes about 5 minutes. It consists of distributing educational resources
and of answering a set of questions on your beliefs and attitudes. You will also
be asked to answer a set of background questions. Please note that you will be
asked to provide your zip code as part of the study. This will only be used to
identify neighborhood demographics and will be deleted prior to data analysis,
such that the data is anonymous.
Confidentiality
All data obtained from you will be treated confidentially and the data will only
be reported in an aggregate format (by reporting only combined results and
never reporting individual ones). The project is scheduled for completion by
April 2019. All submissions will be concealed, and no one other than the pri-
mary investigator will have access to them. The data collected via Qualtrics and
will be stored on a secure server at NHH.
Voluntary participation
It is voluntary to participate in the project, and you can at any time choose to
withdraw your consent without stating any reason. If you decide to withdraw,
your data will not be used and will be deleted.The study has been notified to the
Data Protection Official for Research, NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research
Data.
Questions about the Research
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If subjects have questions about this study or their rights, or if they wish to lodge
a complaint or concern, they may contact us at the following email: thechoice-
lab@nhh.no




• What is your sex?
– Male
– Female
• How old are you?
– 16/17/.../99
• In which state do you currently reside?
– Alabama/Alaska/...list of all states in the US/I do not reside in the
US.
• What is the highest level of education you have completed?






– Professional Degree (JD, MD)
– Doctoral Degree
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• What is your household’s combined yearly income (gross income before
taxes are deducted)?
– Less than $29,999
– $30,000 - $59,999
– $60,000 - $99,999
– $100,000 - $149,999
– $150,000 or more





• Do you have children?
– Yes/No
• What is the zip code of your current residence?
Linking ZIP-codes to background characteristics
I convert the reported ZIP-codes to corresponding census tracts, and match the
census tracts with neighborhood characteristics for each participant in the main
data collection, using data from the Opportunity Atlas (”Neighborhood Charac-
teristics by Census Tract”).17 The analysis is focused around two variables from
the Opportunity Atlas data set. These two variables are18:
• nonwhite share2010: One minus the share of non-Hispanic white resi-
dents in the county, measured in the 2010 Decennial Census.
• gsmn math g3 2013: Mean third-grade mathematics test scores in 2013.
Obtained from the Stanford Education Data Archive and measured at the
district level. A crosswalk is created from districts to tracts by weighting




A.3.3 Instructions: Distributive Choice
Treatment 1: Base
In contrast to traditional survey questions that are about hypothetical situations,
we now ask you to make a choice that may have real consequences for two
children. We ask you to distribute educational resources between two middle-
school students from the US. The two students are both girls from economically
disadvantaged families. One of them learns quickly, the other takes more time
and learns slower.
We ask you to distribute 12 hours of one-to-one tutoring between these two
students. We will randomly select some of the choices from this survey to be
implemented. The students will receive the resources allocated to them without
any information about the survey. Your decision is completely anonymous.
Please state which of the following alternatives you choose:
• The quick learner receives 12 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 0 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 10 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 2 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 8 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 4 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 6 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 6 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 4 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 8 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 2 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 10 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 0 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 12 hours of tutoring.
Treatment 2: Efficiency
In contrast to traditional survey questions that are about hypothetical situations,
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we now ask you to make a choice that may have real consequences for two
children. We ask you to distribute educational resources between two middle-
school students from the US. The two students are both girls from economically
disadvantaged families. One of them learns quickly, the other takes more time
and learns slower.
We ask you to distribute 12 hours of one-to-one tutoring between these two
students. We will randomly select some of the choices from this survey to be
implemented. The students will receive the resources allocated to them with-
out any information about the survey. Your decision is completely anonymous.
Please note that if you choose to increase the amount of tutoring to the slow
learner by 1 hour, the amount of tutoring to the quick learner is decreased by 2
hours.
Please state which of the following alternatives you choose:
• The quick learner receives 12 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 0 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 10 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 1 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 8 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 2 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 6 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 3 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 4 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 4 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 2 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 5 hours of tutoring.
• The quick learner receives 0 hours of tutoring and the slow learner re-
ceives 6 hours of tutoring.
Treatment 3: Motivation
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I include the following sentence at the end of the description of the students
in Treatment 1: Base.
The quick learner is a highly motivated student.
Treatment 4: Efficiency and Motivation
I include the following sentence at the end of the description of the students
in Treatment 2: Efficiency.
The quick learner is a highly motivated student.
A.3.4 Beliefs and Attitudes
We will now ask you a few questions regarding the choice you just made.
1. What was the main reason for your choice? Please explain.
2. If you had to guess, how do you think the level of motivation differs
between the quick and the slow learner?
• The quick learner is much more motivated.
• The quick learner is somewhat more motivated.
• They are equally motivated.
• The slow learner is somewhat more motivated.
• The slow learner is much more motivated.
3. Compared to each other, how do you think the two students would im-
prove their school performance if they were given the same number of
hours of tutoring?
• The quick learner would improve much more.
• The quick learner would improve somewhat more.
• The would improve equally much.
• The slow learner would improve somewhat more.
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• The slow learner would improve much more.
We will now ask you questions regarding a different set of individuals, for
whom you did not make a distributive choice.
Please consider two individuals who who have finished their education.
One of them learns quickly, the other takes more time and learns slower.
Neither of them have achieved their full learning potential and both are
equally far away from it.
4. Which of the individuals do you think has more welfare loss in life? Is
it more welfare loss to the quick learner or the slow learner when they do
not reach their full learning potentials?
• The quick learner has much more welfare loss.
• The quick learner has somewhat more welfare loss.
• They have the same amount of welfare loss.
• The slow learner has somewhat more welfare loss.
• The slow learner has much more welfare loss.
5. Please consider again two individuals who have finished their education.
When do you think there is more welfare loss to society? Is it more wel-
fare loss to society associated with the quick learner or the slow learner
not reaching his/her full learning potential?
• Much more welfare loss to society when the quick learner does not
reach it.
• Somewhat more welfare loss to society when the quick learner does
not reach it.
• The same amount of welfare loss to society for each of them not
reaching it.
• Somewhat more welfare loss to society when the slow learner does
not reach it.
• Much more welfare loss to society when the slow learner does not
reach it.
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6. We now want you to indicate to what extent you agree with the following
statement. 1 means that you agree completely with the statement on the
left, 10 means that you agree completely with the statement on the right,
and the numbers in between indicate the extent to which you agree or

























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A.4 Follow-up
The consent form is equivalent to the consent form provided in A.3.1, and the
background questions are identical to the background questions listed in A.3.2.
A.4.1 Beliefs, Follow-up
The participants are randomized into a treatment involving two girls, or a treat-
ment involving two boys. The treatments are otherwise identical. The instruc-
tions involving two girls are provided below:
Question 1
We would like you to imagine two middle-school students from the US. These
two middle-school students are both girls from economically disadvantaged
families. One of them learns quickly, the other takes more time and learns
slower.
When you think about these two students, what would you expect to be their
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grade point averages (GPAs) when they leave middle-school?
F (0 points) is the lowest possible GPA, while A (4 points) is the highest possi-
ble GPA.
The slow learner: (F:0)/(D:1)/(C:2)/(B:3)/(A:4)
The quick learner: (F:0)/(D:1)/(C:2)/(B:3)/(A:4)
A.5 Empirical Specifications
A.5.1 Effect of Motivation Treatments on Beliefs
The participants were asked about their beliefs about the two learners’ relative
motivation level. I use the responses from this question to test how the mo-
tivation treatments affect beliefs on relative motivation, and use the following
empirical specification:
indmoti = β0 + β1T3T4i + β2Xi + εi, (3)
where indmot is participant i’s belief about the relative motivation level of the
quick and the slow learner and T3T4i is an indicator for participant i belonging
to a treatment where the participant is informed that the quick learner is highly
motivated (T3 or T4).
To see whether the motivation treatments affect beliefs about relative im-
provement with the same amount of tutoring, I replace indmot with indimpr
in (3) and regress (3) on the full sample again. The results are provided in Ta-
ble A.2, columns 3 and 4.
A.5.2 Method of Categorization of Main Reason
Just after the participants had made their distributive decision, they were asked:
“What was the main reason for your choice? Please explain.” The answers were
coded according to pre-determined categories based on 100 random responses.
Two research assistants who did not know the aim of the study coded all re-
sponses independently before merging their categorizations, discussing differ-
ences where necessary. Out of the 2001 responses, 1622 participants had an-
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swers which fit uniquely to one of the four categories: i) Reducing inequality
in outcomes, ii) Reducing inequality in inputs, iii) Efficiency concerns in terms
of maximizing human capital and societal welfare, and iv) Own experience as
slow or quick learner.
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